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"Black Monday," October 19, 1987, sent many financial experts and
investors reeling back to October 28, 1929. Almost fifty-eight years to the
day after the first great crash, "Black Monday" saw the Dow Jones
Industrial Average (DJIA)l plummet 508.32 points in a single day. 2 The
DJIA lost approximately $500 billion of value. This precipitous drop in
the stock market greatly exceeded the fall on October 28, 1929, by 22.6%
to 12.8%, 4 that led to the "Great Depression."
In the wake of its devastation, members of Congress, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC), Self-Regulatory Organizations (SRO),5 commentators, and market
participants alike are deeply divided over the "cause" and the effect of this
market crash. One "cause" that has elicited tremendous debate, splitting
the financial community, has been the role of certain arbitrage and related
trading strategies involving stock index futures and options, commonly
* Associate Dean and Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of
Law, J.D. (1978); LL.M. in Corporate Law (1979), New York University School of Law. I
would like to acknowledge the helpful research assistance of Kimberly Knil and William
Lopshire, Class of 1988. The article does not reflect events and developments after June 7,
1988.
** Staff Attorney, United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of
Corporation Finance; Pepperdine University School of Law, J.D. (1988). The Securities and
Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication
or statement by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the author's colleagues upon the
the staff of the Commission.
1. The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) is the most commonly recognized stock
index and is comprised of thirty of the most widely traded stocks. To compile the DJIA, the
combined price change of all thirty stocks is determined. Next, a constant divisor, a figure to
adjust for changes in the average, is divided into that net change to calculate the gain or loss
for a given day. LrrrLE & RHODES, UNSTA ,NG WALL STEaT 64-66 (1980).
2. The Crash of '87: Stocks Plummet 508 Amid Panicky Selling, Wall St. J., Oct. 20,
1987, at 1, col. 5.
3. Id.
4. Sing, Analysts Look to 1929 for Clues to Direction of Current Bear Market, L.A.
Times, Jan. 12, 1988, Part IV, at 9.
5. Self-Regulatory Organizations are the private corporations that oversee the actual
maintenance of the markets under the control of the SEC. The New York Stock Exchange,
the American Stock Exchange, and the National Association of Securities Dealers are examples
of SROs.
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referred to as program trading.6 Whether program trading, stock index
arbitrage, 7 or portfolio insurance" caused the dramatic drop in the market
may never be known for certain, but its effect is definitely being investi-
gated.9
This Article will attempt to set out the prevailing view of program
trading from the perspective of (1) the financial community; (2) academic
commentators; (3) regulatory bodies, the SEC, CFTC, and other SROs; and
(4) Congress. It will attempt to dispel some of the myths surrounding
program trading while demonstrating that the financial markets have un-
dergone dramatic fundamental changes with the advent of financial futures,
and will certainly continue to do so with the institutionalization and glob-
alization of our capital markets. Regulation of these new and complex
derivative investments will prove to be most challenging to Congress and
the regulatory bodies as they attempt to maintain fair, orderly, and efficient
markets. It is incumbent upon Congress and the regulatory bodies that as
they maintain a fair and orderly market, they must not impairthe efficiency
and liquidity of the market itself.
A major concern of this Article will be the effect of these new derivative
products, i.e., program trading, on the individual investor. Does program
trading hurt or enhance the individual investor? Does program trading
create a market that the individual investor considers too complex and too
volatile, and thus, too confusing for him or her to understand? Because
Congress passed our securities laws in response to the market crash of 1929
and designed the laws to protect investors, individuals, and corporations, it
is important that we keep the role of the securities laws in mind as the
financial markets grow in complexity and design.
I. Tim FnNuiACL FUTURES MARKET
A. The Development of Financial Futures and Options
To better understand the role of program trading in today's markets it
is helpful to examine the development of program trading. Commodities
futures contracts based upon agricultural products have been traded since
1860.10 A commodity futures contract provides for the delivery of a specific
6. Program trading refers to a wide variety of trading strategies. For our purposes,
program trading means many stock trades done quickly and efficiently. Highly automated
trading systems make program trading possible, and institutional investors and securities firms
routinely use program trading.
7. See infra notes 86-96 and accompanying text (discussing stock index arbitrage).
8. See infra notes 64-87 and accompanying text (discussing portfolio insurance).
9. No less than five studies recently have been completed. See The October 1987 Market
Break, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1271 (Feb. 3, 1988) (Extra Edition); Stock Market Crash
of October 1987, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1271 (Feb. 3, 1988); Report of the Presidential
Task Force on Market Mechanisms, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1267 (Jan. 12, 1988) (Extra
Edition). In additon, a report is being completed by the CFTC and a report has been
commissioned by the NYSE.
10. CmCAGO BD. OF TRADE, TBE COMMODrTY TRADiNG MANuAL (1982) [hereinafter
TRADno MANuAL].
PROGRAM TRADING
amount of a commodity at a given price at a designated time in the future."
An example of a commodity futures contract is a contract to deliver 5,000
bushels of wheat in February 1989 for $4.00 per bushel. The farmer who
sells the contract today is assured of receiving $4.00 per bushel for the
wheat in February 1989. By selling the wheat today the farmer foregoes
any increased profit that an increase in wheat prices above $4.00 per bushel
would create. However, the farmer eliminates the risk of wheat prices falling
during the life of the contract. 12 The investor (speculator) purchases the
wheat because he anticipates that the price of wheat will rise during the life
of the contract. The commodity futures contract permits the farmer to
transfer the risk of volatile wheat prices to an investor (speculator) who is
willing to assume such risk, and presumably, who is in a better position to
assume the risk. Thus, commodity futures contracts serve a useful economic
function.
Financial futures essentially were developed to provide this same useful
shifting of risk. Financial futures were a result of volatile currency and
interest rates in the 1960's. Trading in currency futures commenced in 1972,
and trading in interest rate futures started in 1975.13 Currency and interest
rate futures allowed the futures contract seller (farmer) to transfer the risk
of volatile currency and interest rates to an investor (speculator) whose
purchase of the futures contract placed him in a position to assume the
present risk of fluctuation in either market.
In February 1982, the Kansas City Board of Trade introduced the first
stock index futures contract (index futures) based on the Value Line Index.
14
Later that same year, index futures based on the Standard & Poor's 500
Index (S&P 500) and the New York Stock Exchange Composite Index
(NYSE Composite) began trading on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
(CME) and on the New York Futures Exchange (NYFE), respectively. Since
their inception, several other stock index futures contracts based on other
market indices have been introduced.' 5 Index futures are traded actively and
11. BOARD OF GOvERNORs OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, COMMODITY FuuR.Es
TRADING COmmSSiON, SECuRTIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, A STUDY OF TM EFFECTS ON
THE ECONOMY OF TRADINo IN FUTURES AND OPTIONS, (December 1984) [hereinafter FRB/
CFTC/SEC].
12. Id. at 11-1.
13. Program Trading: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Fi-
nance of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (July 23, 1987)
(testimony of William J. Brodsky, Pres. Chicago Mercantile Exchange) [hereinafter Brodsky
Testimony].
14. FRB/CFTC/SEC, supra note 11, at 111-11.
15. The following represents the five most widely used index futures contracts:
Number of Stocks
Contract Name Exchange in Index
S&P 500 Chicago Mercantile Exchange 500
NYSE New York Futures Exchange 1,560
Major Market Chicago Board of Trade 20
1988]
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used for hedging, 6 speculation, 17 ind arbitrage 8 purposes. Thus, like other
financial futures and commodities futures, index futures serve important
risk management functions. 19
Index futures contracts are traded on futures exchanges around the
country, and are now being traded in some foreign countries.2 Floor brokers
conduct trading in stock index futures auction-style in a pit on the floor of
a futures exchange, using open outcries to buy and sell contracts. The dollar
value of an index futures contract generally is 500 times its price. The S&P
100 contract (valued at 200 times its price) and the Major Market Index
(MMI) contract (valued at 100 times its price) are exceptions to this general
rule.
2'
It is important to understand exactly what a stock index futures and a
stock index option are, and the difference between the two, to understand
the role of index futures and index options in program trading. Both index
options and index futures are "derivative" instruments. Index options and
index futures are one step removed from the underlying security or com-
modity to which they relate. 22 Further, both index options and index futures
are able to create leverage relative to cash flow.23
The first difference between options and futures is the character of the
transactions. An option is the "right," which an investor may or may not
exercise, to buy or sell something.? On the other hand, a futures contract
is an "obligation" to buy or sell. The purchase or sale of a futures contract
is tantamount to the purchase or sale of the underlying item, except that
Value-Line Kansas City Board of Trade 1,700
S&P 100 Chicago Mercantile Exchange 100
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, ROUNDTABLE ON INDEX ARBITRAGE (background ma-
terials) (July 9, 1986) [hereinafter ROtNDTABLE].
16. Hedging is the avoidance of risk by selling a futures contract while holding the
underlying security. The hedger foregoes any opportunity to profit from an increase in the
underlying commodity. FRB/CFTC/SEC, supra note 11, at 11-3.
17. Speculation is the buying or selling of index stock futures on options to profit from
moves in the market. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 15; see also FRB/CFTC/SEC, supra note 11,
at 11-5.
18. See infra notes 86-96 and accompanying text (discussing arbitrage).
19. See ROUNDATABLE, supra note 15.
20. Presently, five foreign countries have active stock index futures markets. The markets
are in London, Sydney, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Stockholm. Since index futures were
introduced on these foreign exchanges, the volume of contracts traded has doubled, and in
some instances, quadrupled. Market Brief. Futures-ology, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 31, 1987, at
75.
21. For example, if the S&P 500 stock index were at 250, the initial contract value would
be $125,000 (500 x 250). If the index moved up (down) four points, the investor would gain
(lose) $2,000, depending on whether he or she bought or sold the index futures contract.
ROUNDTABLE, supra note 15.
22. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 15.
23. GOLDMAN SACHS, STOCK INDEX RESEARCH, THE HANDBOOK OF STOCK INDEX ARBi-
TRAGE (June 1985) [hereinafter GOLDMAN SACHS].
24. FRB/CFTC/SEC, supra note 11, at II-1.
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transfer of ownership is delayed in time. Thus, if an investor is long (buys)
or short (sells) futures, the investor is the equivalent of being long or short
the underlying commodity or security. Time and cash flow leverage is the
difference between owning the underlying commodity or security and owning
the futures.Y
A second difference between index options and index futures is in the
method of delivery. Traditional futures contracts are settled by physical
delivery of the underlying commodity or security upon expiration of the
contract. At expiration of the index options or index futures, the obligation
is settled in cash by receiving or paying the cash difference between the
closing value of the index and the previous day's futures price or strike
price of the option.26 The ending value of the index option or index futures,
thus, becomes a function of the value of the index at the contract's
expiration. In all markets, then, there will be a convergence between the
cash (stock market) and the futures and options markets. 27
A third difference between index options and index futures is that
investors usually purchase index futures on margin that differs significantly
from stock margin. An investor purchasing stock in a margin account must
deposit fifty percent of the purchase price in cash or securities. 28 The
investor will then borrow the remaining fifty percent of the purchase price
from the brokerage house and will pay interest on the amount borrowed.
The investor owns the stock purchased and will receive all dividends. In
contrast, an investor purchasing an index futures contract is subject to two
very different types of margin requirements, neither of which involves
borrowed funds. The first is "initial margin," which typically ranges from
five percent to ten percent of the contract's value. 29 Initial margin becomes,
in reality, a good faith deposit or "performance bond," made with the
futures exchange to assure the investor's compliance with the contract. An
investor must post this initial margin with the futures exchange in cash or
Treasury Bills, and the investor receives any interest paid.30
The second type of index futures margin is "variation margin." "Var-
iation margin" ensures that upon final settlement the investor will meet his
contract obligations.3 Variation margin is calculated daily and is based
25. See GOLDMAN SACHS, supra note 23, at 3.
26. Id. Strike price is the predetermined price at which the option or futures may be
exercised. LrrrLE & RHODES, supra note 1, at 19.
27. See GOLDMAN SACHS, supra note 23, at 3.
28. LrrT & RHODES, supra note 1, at 93-95.
29. The exchange upon which the particular index contract trades sets the initial margin
requirements. The highest initial margin (typically 10%) is required for "speculator" positions,
where an investor simply purchases or sells a contract outright. Smaller initial margins (typically
around 5%) are required for "hedged" positions, which entail less risk than speculative
positions. FRB/CFrC/SEC, supra note 11, at 11-14. In response to the market decline of
October 19, 1987, most exchanges have increased their margin requirements to 12-15%.
30. See GOLDMAN SACHS, supra note 23, at 4.
31. Id. at 4. Final settlement for index futures is on the third Friday of the months of
March, June, September, and December.
19881
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upon the difference between the value of the index futures contract and the
previous day's close. The holder of an index futures contract must settle
the variation margin in cash daily.3 2 For example, if the value of the contract
increases, the investor who purchased the contract will receive from the
seller of the contract a cash payment for the amount of the increase in
value. Conversely, if the value of the contract decreases, the investor who
purchased the contract must make to the seller of the contract a cash
payment for the amount of the decrease in value. 33 Although index futures
are highly leveraged, due to low initial margin, daily variation margin
requirements attempt to insure the ability of the parties to meet their
obligation under the contract.
The use of index futures in risk management and as a synthetic equity
34
trading vehicle has led to phenomenal growth in trading volume of all index
products.5 The most heavily traded index futures contract is the S&P 500
on the CME. Approximately 100,000 S&P 500 futures contracts exchange
hands daily, representing $15 billion in underlying value. This amount far
exceeds the approximately $7.9 billion in stock traded daily on the NYSE.
3 6
The enormous growth in index futures has created a derivative equity market
liquid enough to accommodate previously impossible large institutional
trades .3
7
B. The Financial Community and Program Trading
Investors associate stock index futures with the use of program trading
strategies." Investors may use these strategies for index future arbitrage and
portfolio insurance. 39 Stock index futures, used in conjunction with program
trading, have essentially revolutionized portfolio management by allowing
institutional investors to move enormous amounts of capital in the financial
32. SALOMON BROTHERS, INC., MEMORANDUM FOR JULY 9, 1986 SEC ROUNDTABLE Dis-
CUSSION ON THE EFFECTS OF PROGRAM TRADING (June 23, 1986) (contained in ROUNDTABLE,
supra note 15) [hereinafter SALOMON BROTHERS].
33. Id.
34. Trading synthetic stock is buying or selling of futures or options while simultaneously
selling the put. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 15.
35. Program Trading: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Fi-
nance of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 26 (July 23, 1987)
(testimony of R. Sheldon Johnson, principal, Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc.) [hereinafter Johnson
Testimony]. The combined markets for futures and options on stock indices trade assets
representing approximately $25 billion per day. In contrast, the asset value of stocks traded
on the NYSE amount to an average $8 billion per day. Id.
36. Id. at 10.
37. Program Trading: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Fi-
nance of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (July 23, 1987)
(testimony of W. Gordon Binns, Vice President and Chief Investment Funds Officer, General
Motors) [hereinafter Binns Testimony].
38. Grossman, An Analysis of the Implications for Stock and Futures Price Volatility




markets. 40 Because index futures and index options create greater liquidity,
institutions can trade billions of dollars of synthetic equities at a lower cost,
and with greater efficiency, than institutions can trade in the underlying
stock market.
41
In actuality, program trading refers to the buying or selling of a large
group of securities at a single point in time, as if that portfolio was a single
security. 42 Program trades often are placed through the NYSE high-speed
order system, DOT (designated order turnaround). 43 Program trading has
been around since the early seventies, but until the introduction of stock
index futures in the early eighties, and the public's perception that program
trading caused the wild gyrations in the market, program trading did not
receive any real critical attention.
As institutional investors became increasingly dominant in the market,
program trading was introduced in response to the institutions' need for
liquidity in the equity market. 4 The growth of employee pension plans with
billions of dollars in assets prompted the development of efficient trading
methods for large-scale equity transactions. Prior to this time, the illiquidity -
of the market and the enormous transaction costs effectively foreclosed
institutional investors from investing quickly and efficiently in the stock
market.
Block trading45 was introduced to facilitate equity market liquidity.
Advances in communication technologies permitted greater participation in
the block network. Further advances in computer technologies and pro-
40. Sebastian, Linked Deals in Stocks and Futures Contracts Roil Prices, Critics Say,
Wall St. J., Oct. 22, 1985, at 1, col. 6; see also Laderman, Those Big Swings on Wall Street,
Bus. WK., April 7, 1986, at 32.
41. Sebastian, supra note 40.
42. Sebastian, How Program Trading Works and Why It Causes Controversy in the
Stock Market, Wall St. J., Jan. 10, 1986, at 19, col. 4.
43. See Russell, Manic Market, Tno, Nov. 10, 1986, at 68. The NYSE DOT system is
an automated execution and reporting system which allows brokers to enter their orders directly
from a computer terminal in their office. Id. The DOT system then sends the orders directly
to one of fourteen specialist posts located on the floor of the NYSE, where the orders are
executed immediately, and the broker receives confirmation of the trade within minutes. Id.
44. The growth of the institutional investor is phenomenal, considering that in 1960 the
institutional investor and individual investor were about evenly split in terms of equity trading
volume. Presently, the institutional investor often is responsible for ninety percent of equity
trading volume. One reason for the change is individuals' growing use of mutual funds as the
preferred equity investment vehicle. Nearly half of the forty-seven million Americans owning
stock do so through mutual funds, and shareholders have increased by approximately three
million in the last two years. See id. at 65.
45. A block of stock usually is composed of 10,000 shares of a single corporation. A
block trader will receive an order and then will check the floor of the NYSE to see if there
is sufficient liquidity to execute the block order at, or close to, the current market price. If
the price on the floor is not favorable, the block trader will attempt to match the order at a
more competitive price with another block trader or an institutional investor. An entire network
for buying or selling large blocks of stock developed which was not restricted to the available
quotes made by the specialists on the floor of the exchange.
1988]
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gramming led to an increase in the size of block transactions to include
entire portfolios of stocks, or program trades.
46
Stock index futures now are being used to implement program trading
strategies. For example, index futures provide a hedging device which reduces
substantially the risk of dealing in large equity portfolio transactions. A
trader can trade virtually risk free an entire portfolio of equities held in
proportion to the S&P 500 Index by purchasing a S&P 500 futures contract
when selling the portfolio, or by selling a S&P 500 futures contract when
buying the equity portfolio. Therefore, stock index futures have allowed
brokerage firms and professional traders to make markets in large diversified
portfolios by substantially eliminating the risk of the market rising or falling
as they enter into a transaction to buy or sell the portfolio. As index
futures' hedging capability enables investors to execute larger program trades
closer to the prevailing market price, liquidity in the equity market increases
and risk decreases.47 This hedging capability allows institutions to buy or
sell their portfolios with the same liquidity that individuals enjoy. As a
result, institutions with an estimated $1 trillion in assets have allocated a
larger portion of their funds to equity. 4 This willingness to assume greater
equity exposure is reflected in the fact that the volume on the NYSE alone
has increased 150-fold, from 35.7 billion shares in 1976 to 5.4 trillion shares
in 1987.
49
In addition to liquidity, other benefits flow from the use of stock index
futures. The financial community believes that a comparison of the costs
of transacting in the futures market as opposed to the stock market, reveals
strong incentives to use the former. Commission charges or transaction
costs alone yield a 13-1 advantage for trading in the futures market rather
than trading in the stock market.5 0 Futures produce even greater savings in
terms of market impact costs. Market impact costs are costs incurred from
buying or selling large quantities of a particular security or a group of
46. See Salomon Brothers, supra note 32.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Program Trading: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Fi-
nance of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 23, 1987)
(testimony of Charles J. Henry, Pres. and CEO, Chicago Board Options Exchange) [hereinafter
Henry Testimony].
50. The following table illustrates the commission cost savings of transacting in futures
as opposed to transacting in the underlying equities with a portfolio of securities that exactly
replicates the S&P 500 stock index:
S&P 500 PORTFOLIO S&P 500 FUTURES
Volume: 2,400,000 Shares 1,000 contracts
Cost Per unit: $0.07 share $12.50/contract
Roundtrip Total: $336,000 $25,000
CHICAGO MERCANTILE EXCHANGE, PROGRAM TRADING: AN ON-THE-REcoRD SYMPosIUM 8 (June
17, 1986) [hereinafter Symposium].
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securities at a single point in time.5' Market impact reflects the nature of
supply and demand. Market impact will result from an increased bid-asked
spread to effect the transaction. In terms of market impact costs, there is
the equivalent of a 24-1 advantage to trading in the futures market versus
the equities market. 52 By removing both transaction and market costs of
large-scale institutional investment in the stock market, market professionals
believe that program trading has allowed billions of dollars to enter into
the market, thus lowering the cost of capital for our nation's businesses.
53
In addition to the cost advantages of stock index futures, financial
institutions benefit from the use of stock index futures because financial
institutions can execute large index futures transactions more rapidly than
stock market transactions. For example, an institution can buy or sell 1,000
futures contracts in five to ten minutes, with total transaction costs of
approximately $37,500.14 For an institution to buy or sell a corresponding
amount of equities would take fifteen to twenty minutes with a total
transaction cost of approximately $730,000, and a far greater market impact
cost.5 Thus, the financial community sees a tremendous benefit to trans-
acting in index futures. These benefits have led to numerous applications
of index futures to portfolio management.
One application of index futures to portfolio management is the use of
index futures as a pure trading vehicle. The use of index futures as a pure
trading vehicle allows investors to participate in the movement of an entire
stock index rather than in the movement of an individual security. Parti-
cipants who apply index futures in this way are mostly "locals. 5 6 Locals,
who account for approximately fifty-five percent of index futures volume,
primarily trade on fundamentals.
7
51. Id.
52. The following table represents the market impact cost savings of transacting in futures
versus transacting in the underlying equities with a S&P 500 portfolio:
S&P 500 EQUITIES S&P 500 FUTURES
Last Bid Ask Last Bid Ask
Market 242.00 241.40 242.60 243.50 243.50 243.55
Bid/Ask Spread 1.20 Index Point .05 Index Point
Dollar Value $600,000 $25,000
Id. at 8.
53. Brodsky Testimony, supra note 13, at 6.
54. Id. at 14.
55. Id.
56. "Locals" are generally floor traders, trading for their own account. Locals typically
never hold an open position for more than an hour at a time. Johnson Testimony, supra note
35, at 21.
57. Id. Technical analysts base investment decisions "on the underlying assumption that
investors expect certain buying and selling patterns to repeat themselves with some degree of
reliability and regularity .... Fundamental analysis attempts to predict future securities prices
by examining the historical data. . . ." Kerr, Suitability Standards: A New Look At Economic
Theory and Current SEC Disclosure Policy, 16 PAC. L. J. 805, § 15-16 (1985); see also Bines,
Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Management Law: Refinement of Legal Doctrine,
76 CoLum. L. REv. 721, 722-23 & 789-90 (1976).
1988]
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A second application of index futures to portfolio management, em-
ployed primarily by institutions, is the use of index futures as a cost efficient
means of asset allocation and deployment. Mutual funds receiving large
inflows of capital from shareholders, or pension funds receiving lump-sum
contributions from plan sponsors, immediately can gain equity exposure in
a rising stock market by purchasing index futures.58 To obtain the same
equity exposure through direct stock purchases would incur millions of
dollars of additional transaction costs, because of the market impact of a
multi-million dollar transaction. Likewise, an institution that desires to
restructure a portfolio of stocks, bonds, and cash in response to changing
economic and financial conditions may do so by buying and selling index
futures or bond futures. 9 By using futures to effect the asset shift quickly
and efficiently, the institution assures a cost-effective execution, while
limiting its exposure to adverse market movements during the restructuring
period 0
A third application of index futures to portfolio management, employed
primarily by institutions, is in the area of risk management. The risk
management use of index futures provides a hedging vehicle for controlling
the risks associated with holding large equity portfolios. 6' A brokerage house
that has contracted to underwrite a large initial public offering can reduce
its exposure to a broad stock market decline by selling index futures during
the pendency of the offering.6 2 Similarly, a specialist on the floor of the
NYSE who is obligated to purchase large quantities of stock as a market
maker can reduce the risk of holding its inventory by selling index futures.
6 3
The enormous growth of the use of portfolio insurance by money managers,
pension funds, and other institutional investors attests to the ability of index
futures to control the risks of holdiig large equity portfolios.
Portfolio insurance, or dynamic asset allocation or dynamic hedging,
refers to a wide variety of hedging64 strategies that use index futures to
protect the existing value of an equity portfolio in a declining market but
at the cost of foregoing total participation in a rising market.6 5 According
to financial experts, portfolio insurance is the fastest growing institutional
use of index futures.66 At the beginning of 1986, portfolio insurance covered
approximately $4 billion of institutional assets. 67 In early 1987, some form
58. Binns Testimony, supra note 37, at 3.
59. Bookstaber & Langsam, Portfolio Insurance: Asset Allocation for Capital Preser-
vation, at 9 (Morgan Stanley, 1986) (unpublished report).




64. See supra note 16 (explaining concept of hedging).
65. See Black & Jones, Simplifying Portfolio Insurance (Goldman Sachs Research, August
1986); Bookstaber & Langsam, supra note 59.
66. Wells, A Major Index Trader in Stock Crunch, L.A. Times, Nov. 24, 1987, Part
IV, at 1.
67. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE CONMZnSSION, DivSION OF MARKET REGULATION, THE RoLE
1000
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of portfolio insurance protected an estimated $80 billion of institutional
assets.
68
Portfolio insurance is, in reality, a misnomer because no actual insurance
policy exists that guarantees the value of the portfolio. Portfolio insurance
establishes a minimum value for the equity portfolio for some given point
in the future. 69 The strategy uses a combination of stocks, futures, and cash
to assure that the portfolio does not decrease beyond the selected minimum
value. The objective of the strategy is to move progressively more of the
portfolio's assets into equities as the stock market rises, or into cash or
Treasury Bills as the market declines.70 Index futures are used to effect the
designated asset allocation ratio, because total transaction costs in the index
futures market are small compared to transaction costs in the equity
market.7' As the market rises above a predetermined figure, index futures
are purchased, giving the portfolio greater equity exposure. Conversely, if
the market declines beyond a predetermined figure, index futures are sold
and the proceeds invested in money markets or Treasury Bills, thus reducing
the risk of the portfolio. This constant readjustment of the portfolio's assets
between cash and equities protects the minimal value chosen at a cost of
slightly underperforming the stock market as a whole.
7 2
By using index futures to implement the desired asset allocation, the
portfolio insurance strategy becomes noninvasive.7 3 The strategist's decision
to reduce the fund's equity exposure will not affect equity portfolios under
active management. If and when the market declines, index futures will be
sold to hedge the risks of holding the underlying stocks. 74 Thus, this
noninvasiveness of portfolio insurance will separate the risk control and
active asset management functions.7 5 Money managers covered by portfolio
insurance will pursue their own investment strategies without the plan
sponsor76 directing them to liquidate part of their equity portfolio to reduce
the fund's overall stock exposure.
77
OF INDEX-RELATED TRAoiNG IN THE MARKEr DECLINE ON SEPTEMBER 11 AND 12, 1986 (March
1987) [hereinafter SECI.
68. See Wells, supra note 66.
69. Bookstaber & Langsam, supra note 59, at 3.
70. See Symposium, supra note 50.
71. See id.
72. "A portfolio insurance program with an objective of no loss after three years is
expected to enable the investor to capture about 85% of the potential gains from equities,
while eliminating loss ... the cost of portfolio insurance is that less than 100% of equity
gains will be captured, if there are such gains over the time horizon of the strategy." Program
Trading: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (July 23, 1987) (testimony of Hayne E.
Leland, Principal, Leland O'Brien Rubenstein Associates, Inc.).
73. Bookstaber & Langsam, supra note 59, at 17.
74. Id. at 19.
75. Id.
76. A plan sponsor is a corporation who contributes cash to a pension plan.
77. Bookstaber & Langsam, supra note 59, at 19.
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As this country's longest bull market continued, portfolio insurance
seemed almost utopian in nature to large money managers. Institutional
money managers with enormous unrealized capital gains that had accrued
for the past five years used this innovative hedging strategy to protect their
funds.78 Portfolio insurance permitted institutional funds to participate in
the continuing bull market without liquidating their equity portfolios.
7 9
Therefore, pension funds and other institutional investors, by relying on
portfolio insurance, began investing larger portions of their assets in equities,
pushing the bull market even higher. 0 Billions of institutional dollars were
invested in the equity and futures markets using a strategy never tested
during a bear market. Unabashed support for portfolio insurance was shown
by the remarks of one corporate money manager who stated that portfolio
insurance allowed Manville Corporation to overhaul its pension asset allo-
cation, eliminating fixed income, except in special cases. "Essentially [Man-
ville Corp.] bec[a]me an equity orientated program." 81 Portfolio insurance
allowed Manville to reduce its annual pension fund contribution from $33
million to only $8 million. 82 This was significant for Manville because it
was presently in reorganization under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code.
Unfortunately, many institutional money managers did not question the
assumptions upon which portfolio insurance was predicated. For portfolio
insurance to work effectively, index futures prices must closely track the
underlying stock prices in the index. Until Black Monday, stock index
arbitrage maintained this vital nexus.8 3 Some portfolio insurance strategies
failed to maintain their targeted protection levels during the crash, although
others were much more successful.8 4 The relative success of several portfolio
insurance strategies during the crash, and the benefits derived from their
use, undoubtedly will assure the survival of portfolio insurance as a risk
management strategy. However, the use of portfolio insurance may be
78. Id. at 3.
79. Id.
80. In a review of stock market volatility on September 11 and 12, 1986, the SEC
Division of Market Regulation concluded:
The Division's review documented the substantial increase in the use of stock market
futures by institutional investors ... other investors, particularly some pension funds
that previously had limited investments in equities, may invest a larger portion of
their assets in the equity market, in part because of the perceived ability to limit
risk through portfolio insurance.
See SEC, supra note 67, at 2.
81. Ring, Manville Slashes Fixed-Income Use Through Hedging, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS
AGE, Feb. 17, 1986, at 1.
82. Id.
83. See infra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing role of stock index arbitrage in
maintaining link between index futures and underlying equities).
84. While many protected funds felt the brunt of the stock market's decline, others with
a maximum target loss of 5% were down only 6-8%. Anders, Portfolio Insurance Proved
Cold Comfort, Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1987, at 6.
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limited in the near term because of its possible role in the market decline. s5
Stock index arbitrage is the final form of hedging. Stock index arbitrage
attempts to combine a portfolio of stocks with index futures "with the
objective of achieving a higher return than that available in other investments
of comparable risk. ' 8 6 Index arbitrage generally involves the purchase of a
portfolio of equity securities (long) that approximates the S&P 500 Index,
or one of the other indexes, and the simultaneous sale of futures contracts
(short) based on the index. 7 It is in this context that program trading plays
a significant role.
Stock index futures and stock index options only will provide benefits
to institutions and money managers if the derivative instruments are linked
to the underlying index. Stock index arbitrage attempts to maintain this
link between the futures and options and the cash markets upon which the
futures and options are basedA8 Market participants entering into opposite
positions in the two markets create the link. For example, if prices are too
high in one market and too low in the other, a participant may sell short
in one market and long in the other. Arbitrage will maintain the link
between the markets.
The futures price, however, will not necessarily equal the cash price.
Instead, the futures price will tend to close at a price higher than the
underlying cash price equal to the cost of carrying the "security traded in
the cash market until the futures delivery date." 89 Such cost includes interest
paid on borrowed funds, transaction costs, 9° and market impact costs. 91
When the futures index moves higher than its equilibrium alignment with
its underlying index, index arbitrage by market professionals will force the
prices in the two markets to converge.92 For instance, if the futures index
is too high, institutions have an opportunity to sell the futures contract
while borrowing funds to buy the underlying securities. 93 Thus, if the
arbitrager holds the securities to maturity he has guaranteed himself a
certain profit.9 4 As these price differences narrow, only those participants
with the lowest costs will profit from stock index arbitrage and the oppor-
tunities for index arbitrage will begin to decline. Index arbitrage programs
are not continuous, and because there is a great deal of competition among
85. See supra notes 64-82 and accompanying text (discussing role of portfolio insurance
in stock market decline).
86. Zurack, Has the Stock Market Become More Volatile Since The Introduction of
Stock Index Futures Contacts?, at 2 (Goldman Sachs Research, Nov. 1985).
87. Id.
88. Sebastian, supra note 42, at 18.
89. FRB/CFTC/SEC, supra note 11, at 11-27.
90. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (noting that investors incur lower transaction
costs in futures market).
91. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (noting lower market impact costs of
futures transactions).
92. Sebastian, supra note 42; see Johnson Testimony, supra note 35, at 14.
93. FRB/CFTC/SEC, supra note 11, at II-28.
94. Id.
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arbitragers, arbitragers only place programs when an opportunity exists to
execute a program successfully. Evidence suggests that the "frequency...
and magnitude . . . of index arbitrage opportunities have declined over
time, indicating the beneficial functioning of the arbitrage process." 9s
Many see stock index arbitrage trading strategies as contributing to the
short-term price volatility in the securities markets. When stock index
arbitrage trading strategies are unwound, large buy or sell orders in the
stocks that comprise an index are entered at or near the close on expiration
day. Some feel that this influx of orders at the close results in imbalances
that contribute to market volatility. 96
Additionally, significant moves on nonexpiration days, such as Black
Monday, have been attributed to stock index arbitrageY Prior to Black
Monday the financial community presented evidence indicating that the
volatility in the market arising from index arbitrage had not increased
overall market volatility.9 A further study in 1985, by Laszlo Birinyi, Jr.
and H. Nicholas Hanson, of Salomon Brothers, Inc. showed that day to
day price changes in percentage terms has actually decreased since the mid-
1970's.99changes in percentage terms has actually decreased since the mid-
1970's. 99 Further, the daily percentage price change in the S&P 500 showed
decreasing volatility from 1970 to the third quarter of 1985.100 The Birinyi
and Hanson study also looked at the intraday movement of the DJIA. The
research determined that there were times of significant movements, but
"no evidence of increased short-term market movements over the past
several years."'' A mid-1986 update to this study did not produce a
significantly different conclusion.'0 2
Thus, independent research of market volatility, as measured by the
average close over close price change'0 3 in stocks, demonstrates that market
volatility has been no higher in recent years than in years prior to the
advent of program trading. New derivative investments have merely per-
mitted institutional investors, many of which hold individual investors'
funds, to shift or allocate the risk inherent in the marketplace to those
more willing and able to bear it. Volatility in the market, in general, may
95. See SALOMoN BROTHERS, supra note 32.
96. Sebastian, supra note 42.
97. See SEC, supra note 67; Sebastian, supra note 42; Program Trading: Hearings before
the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 23, 1987) (testimony of R. Steven Wunsch, Vice President, Kidder
Peabody & Co., Inc.) [hereinafter Wunsch Testimony].
98. Zurack, supra note 86, at 4.




102. Birinyi & Hanson, Market Volatility: An Updated Study (Salomon Brothers Inc.,
July 1986).




result from supply and demand imbalances and from changes in current
economic or financial expectations. When futures or options show significant
premiums (discounts) to the underlying index, this premium (discount) will
reflect current judgments regarding the financial outlook of the stock
market. The average yields from stock index arbitrage have been declining
in recent years from 200-300 basis points to 50-100 basis points above
money market instruments such as Treasury Bills. 104 The decline in yield
can directly be attributed to the increasing amount of capital committed to
stock index arbitrage. Estimates prior to the crash indicated that when
adequate premiums and discounts are available, approximately $15 to $20
billion is available for stock index arbitrage. °5 Consequently, stock index
arbitrage returns decreased as the number of arbitragers competing for the
limited opportunities available increased.' 6
Advances in computer and telecommunications technology has increased
the timeliness for analyzing economic and financial information. Institutions
and portfolio managers can decipher information quickly and revise invest-
ment strategies accordingly. Computers merely have provided the mechan-
isms to implement changes in portfolio strategies in an efficient and cost
effective manner. As more market participants understand the technological
concepts, market volatility should begin to decrease.
II. ACADEMIA AND PROGRAm TR Gn'o
In November of 1985, representatives of the NYSE and the American
Stock Exchange concluded that an independent, comprehensive study of
stock futures and options was required.0 7 Since trading in stock futures
and stock options had grown tremendously and had drawn substantial
investor attention, the SEC asked Professors Hans L. Stoll, of Vanderbilt
University, and Robert R. Whaley, of the University of Alberta, and the
Graduate School of Business at the University of Chicago, to perform a
study.'10 In response, Stoll and Whaley examined in detail expiration day
effects on the market. This portion of the Article will discuss their findings,
as well as the findings of Professor Sandford J. Grossman,'69 on the effect
derivative investments have on the stock market.
Stoll and Whaley began by studying the characteristics and uses of
index futures and options. Stoll and Whaley stated that "[t]he widespread
trading of options and futures on stock indices ... attests to the uses of
104. See Johnson Testimony, supra note 35, at 16.
105. Id. at 17.
106. Id. at 16.
107. Letter from John D. Dingell (Mich.), Chairman, House of Representatives Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, to John S.R. Shad, Chairman Securities and Exchange Commission
(April 16, 1986).
108. Stoll & Whaley, Expiration Day Effects of Index Options and Futures (March 15,
1986) (unpublished report).
109. Grossman, supra note 38.
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options and futures as hedging" ° vehicles, as [a] cost saving means of
adjusting positions in underlying assets, and as [a] cost effective means of
registering opinions about the value of underlying assets."'' Stoll and
Whaley concluded that a "careful analysis of these instruments shows that
they yield benefits not only to private users but also to society as a whole.""
2
Private users and society accrue these benefits in four ways. First, stock
index futures and options "modify the risk characteristics of a portfolio,""
3
while allowing investors to assume only those risks with which they feel
most comfortable.11 4 For instance, an investor might purchase a put to
guard against a decrease in the market price. Second, index futures and
options can help underwriters and market makers." 5 Market makers could
either sell futures or buy puts to hedge an inventory position. Third,
institutional investors can use index futures and options to decrease the
costs assumed when trading the underlying portfolio of stocks." 6 According
to Stoll and Whaley, the cost of trading the underlying portfolio decreases
"because transaction costs are considerably lower in the futures market than
in the stock market.""17 Fourth, institutions "temporarily changing the
proportion of stocks in [their] portfolio" could effect the changes by trading
in stock futures and options," 8 and at less cost than trading in the underlying
stocks.
A major 9tudy done before Stoll and Whaley's determined that "very
little purely speculative activity is engaged in by institutional investors in
new options and futures products.""' 9 This study found that, on the con-
trary, institutions have been using options and futures to hedge risk or to
efficiently manage their existing investment strategies. Individuals and com-
mercial traders, on the other hand, predominately are taking speculative
positions in index options or futures.
120
The increased use and success of index futures and options, in con-
junction with investor suspicion and misunderstanding of futures and op-
tions, has led to vocal outbursts that futures and options markets have "a
destabilizing effect on traditional stock markets."'' The major concern,
according to Stoll and Whaley, has been that options and futures markets
110. See supra note 16 (explaining hedging).
Ill. Stoll & Whaley, supra note 108, at 3.
112. Id. at 3-4.
113. Id. at 4.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 5.
117. Id. Assuming a commission rate of $.07 per share, the one way commission cost of
selling 100 S&P 500 futures contracts is approximately $1,250, while the cost of selling a
similar amount of stock ($10 million) is approximately $17,500. Id.
118. Id.
119. FRB/CFTC/SEC, supra note 11, at IV-A-13.
120. Id.




will decrease liquidity in the underlying markets and, thus, adversely affect
prices in those underlying markets.'22 An added concern in this area is that
futures and options could affect the capital formation process itself.
23
A further concern of the financial community is the effect of index
futures and options on expiration days in which large price declines have
occurred, the so-called "triple witching hour."124 Stoll and Whaley, however,
found that, if linked to the underlying indices, index futures and options
provide benefits and liquidity to investors. Index arbitrage maintains the
link between the futures and options and the underlying indices, and
"through arbitrage, the liquidity of the underlying market is enhanced."'
2
Another study also concluded that the continued use of stock futures and
options increased the liquidity in the underlying markets.
126
Stoll and Whaley found "large volume effects and certain price effects
on quarterly expirations. . . ."'27 Stoll and Whaley determined, further, that
price effects were not significant if stock index options alone expired. No
price effect was seen for stocks not in the S&P 500 Index. 28 Experts,
however, have expressed concern that the stock market suffers because of
the great volatility during the last hour of trading. Individual investors may
be buying during an unnatural rise in the market or selling during a
temporary low in the market. Stock index arbitragers, on the other hand,
are unaffected by the direction in which index stocks are unwound "so
long as the closing price on each of the stocks is received."' 29 Arbitragers
are unaffected because cash settlement of the stock index futures or options
guarantees convergence of the futures and cash price at maturity.
"[C]onvergence guarantees a perfectly hedged arbitrager the arbitrage profit
calculated when the position was established regardless of the index value
at expiration."'' 30
Stoll and Whaley's empirical studies showed that prices were more
volatile on expiration day. However, Stoll and Whaley also determined that
prices tended to reverse on the day after expiration Friday.'3' Expiration
day effects are associated with stocks that are a part of an arbitrage
unwinding, not with stocks in a nonarbitrage position. Similarly, evidence
clearly shows that the expiration of stock index futures affects stock market
122. Stoll & Whaley, supra note 108, at 6.
123. Id.
124. Stoll, supra note 121, at 3.
125. Stoll & Whaley, supra note 108, at 8.
126. FRB/CFTC/SEC, supra note 11, at 1-2.
127. Stoll, supra note 121, at 3 (noting findings of Stoll and Whaley in 1986 and 1987
studies).
128. Id.
129. Stoll & Whaley, supra note 108, at 20. If the stock index arbitrager is in a perfectly
hedged position, the loss (gain) on the stock is offset by the gain (loss) on the futures position.
Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 27-28.
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volume. 132 Stoll's study showed that last hour volume averaged 22 million
shares in 1986 while last hour volume averaged 77 million shares in 1986-
1987.131
Price and volume effects associated with expiration days generally are
considered undesirable and must be evaluated in terms of whom the volatility
hurts and what is the cost of alternative solutions. As with any market
phenomenon, the more informed investors are better able to decide when
or when not to enter the market. For example, one group of investors
whom market volatility may financially hurt is investors who submit market
orders'34 to sell when an expiration day effect is pushing prices down, or
who submit market orders to buy when expiration is pushing stock prices
up. Buying high and selling low is not the age old proverb for making
money. According to Stoll and Whaley, and other commentators, however,
this expiration day phenomenon has the advantage of occurring at a
predictable time. The predictability of the phenomenon gives the small
investor the option of staying away. 3 5 Because a reversal will occur, 3 6 small
investors will have the opportunity to invest upon the reversal.
In a separate study, Stoll found that the expiration day price reversal
is directly comparable to and significantly less than the block trade 37 price
reversal. The price reversal associated with block transactions usually is
interpreted as "the necessary cost of providing immediacy 38 in transactions
of that size.' '139 Block transaction effects are not as noticeable as expiration
day effects simply because different blocks will trade at different times.
Expiration day effects, on the other hand, will occur in all index stocks in
the last hour of the expiration close. 40 Thus, Stoll contends that the "average
expiration day price effect is roughly of the same magnitude as the price
132. Id. at 24.
133. Stoll, supra note 121, at 5.
134. A market order is an order to buy or sell at the best possible price as soon as it
can be accomplished. LIrrL & RHODES, supra note 1, at 17.
135. Stoll & Whaley, supra note 108, at 34-35.
136. See id. at 26. "Since the unwinding of arbitrage positions could cause price pressures
either in an upward or downward direction, the emphasis is on the volatility of prices at
expiration . . . [Wle are concerned with abnormal price changes, we seek reversals of prices.
If a price change on the expiration day is abnormal and is caused by selling pressure or buying
pressure, the price would tend to return to a normal level on the following day.... If the
price fails to reverse after a decline, the decline is judged to be the result of new information
that justifies a new lower price. If the price reverses part of the way . . . the reversal portion
of the initial decline [is] judged to be unjustified by new information and is ascribed to the
price impact of the transaction. If the price reverses by more than initial decline ... the entire
initial decline is judged to be the price impact and the excess reversal is judged to be the result
of information. A corresponding interpretation applies to price reversals after a price increase."
Id.
137. See supra note 45 (explaining block trading).
138. Market participants "provide immediacy to anxious sellers by buying shares at the
bid price or to anxious buyers by selling shares at the ask price." Stoll, supra note 121, at 7.




impacts observed in normal transactions that reflect the cost of supplying
immediacy."' 41 Stoll does not feel that the concern regarding price and
volume effects is warranted. 142 Stoll understands, however, that from a
public policy perspective there have been particular days in which "price
reversals substantially in excess of the average [expiration day] effect oc-
curred.'14'
Another major study that attempts to ascertain the effect of derivative
investments on the stock markets is Professor Sandford Grossman's of
Princeton University. Grossman prepared a recent report for the conference
on the Impact of Stock Index Futures Trading at the Center for the Study
of Futures Markets, Columbia University, held on June 8, 1987.144 The
report, among other things, focused on the informational problems that the
use of dynamic hedging strategies, such as portfolio insurance, cause.
145
Grossman postulates that informational problems can affect the volatility
of the market. Grossman states that the information flowing from the
trading of a real security is different, and less complete, than the information
flowing from dynamic hedging strategies where the real security is not
traded. 146 To underline these informational disparities, Grossman states:
... [i]f everyone in the economy would like to get out of stocks
before the price falls by more than 25%, then the price of such a
put option would be very high. If only a few holders of stocks
desired such protection then the put option's market price would
be low. The put's price thus reveals information now about the
fraction of people with plans to get out of stocks in the future.
The put's price reveals the extent to which the strategies of people
can cohere in the future. By showing people the true cost of their
plans, it may discourage people from attempting to purchase too
much insurance in exactly those circumstances when the dynamic
hedging strategy would cause excessive stock price volatility. 147
According to Grossman, all information that an investor normally
receives when a real security is traded is unavailable when dynamic hedging
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 12.
144. Grossman, supra note 38.
145. Grossman states:
Recent advances in financial theory have created an understanding of the environ-
ments in which a real security can be synthesized by a dynamic trading strategy in
a risk free asset and other securities .... The issuer of a new security can price the
security based on its ability to synthesize the returns stream of the new security
using a dynamic trading strategy in existing securities, futures and options. This use
of dynamic trading strategies has been extended even further by eliminating the
"new" security altogether and just selling the dynamic hedging strategy directly.
Portfolio insurance is the best example of the latter phenomenon.
Grossman, supra note 38, at 1.
146. Id. at 3.
147. Id. at 2-3.
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strategies are used alone. 148 Grossman questions how a purchaser of a
dynamic hedging strategy' 49 can know the cost of using portfolio insurance
if the purchaser does not know how many other people are planning to
carry out similar stock selling and purchasing plans in the future.'50 The
cost of using a dynamic hedging strategy depends on the future investment
plans of others. The trading of real securities supplies the necessary infor-
mational coherence. As a result of incomplete information gathering, syn-
thetic trading strategies do not provide the necessary informational coherence.
Investors must attempt to gather this information, if possible, before an
investor can make an informed investment decision about trading strategies
and before market reaction can be calculated.
These informational inadequacies, Grossman explains, can affect vola-
tility if market participants lack current information about the future trading
plans of others and the cost involved in dynamic hedging strategies, such
as portfolio insurance.15 ' In the absence of a real traded security, such as
a put option, Grossman contends that:
There will be less information about the future price volatility
associated with current dynamic hedging strategies. There will be
less information transmitted to those people who could make capital
available to liquidity providers. It will therefore be more difficult
for the market to absorb the trades implied by the dynamic hedging
strategies. In effect, the stocks' future price volatilit can rise
because of a current lack of information about the extent to which
dynamic hedging strategies are in place.
52
Regardless of these informational problems and possible stock price vola-
tility, Grossman concludes that dynamic hedging strategies are valuable
because the dynamic hedging strategies increase returns to investors. 53
Grossman questions whether stock price volatility is, in fact, "socially
harmful or even worthy of regulation.'
5 4
Thus, the academic community does not argue that stock index futures
and options have not had an effect on the stock market as a whole. These
academic commentators, however, suggest that the effect is positive, rather
than negative. Most commentators claim that the issue is whether appro-
priate exchange regulatory procedures presently exist to handle the unex-
pected imbalances that the use of these strategies may cause. If the imbalances
can be avoided, the instances of large price reversal can also be avoided.
Accordingly, commentators propose numerous recommendations and
solutions to combat the whipsaw effect of stock futures and options expi-
148. Id. at 3.
149. Grossman uses a synthetic put as an example. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 3-4.
152. Id. at 4-5.
153. See id. at 29.
154. Id. at 29-30.
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ration days. Stoll and Whaley examined five of these solutions in their
original study. The proposed solutions were: (1) the telescoping of position
limits; (2) the delivery of shares; (3) the averaging of index prices; (4) the
change in stock market procedures and disclosure; and (5) the shifting of
expiration days.
In 1987, with more current information, Stoll discussed the telescoping
of position limits, the average index price, the shifting of expiration days,
and the disclosure of arbitrage positions. Stoll also discussed three proposals
that the SEC made in June, 1985.1'" With these proposals, the SEC intended
to modify trading procedures rather than to modify futures contracts. The
three SEC proposals were: (1) disclosure of market-on-close (MOC)' 56 orders
before the close; (2) a trading halt; and (3) a change to opening price.
A. Telescoping of Position Limits
Telescoping of position limits is the "reduction in allowable futures
market positions as the expiration day approaches. ' 15 7 The telescoping
proposal would require institutional investors with large arbitrage positions
to unwind some of these positions early. Consequently, the unwinding of
positions on expiration day is reduced significantly. This proposal would
"reduce the effectiveness of futures and options in the hedging and risks
[sic] management activities of major institutional investors." 15 8 Stoll believes
that this proposal would require "institutional investors to bear additional
risk .... ,,159 Accordingly, some institutional investors may only take posi-
tions in stock index futures and options that are below the telescoping
limits. The telescoping proposal would limit the effectiveness of stock index
futures and options "as hedging and risk management tools in large port-
folios."60
In his separate study Stoll points out that telescoping may also increase
the cost of arbitrage without necessarily reducing arbitrage unwinding at
expiration. Stoll believes that new arbitragers will enter the market. The
new arbitrager, however, will take only positions that are below the tele-
scoping limits that they can hold to maturity, thus guaranteeing convergence
and limiting any kind of basis risk.' 6' It is possible that any decline in the
size of "individual arbitrage positions" could be offset "by a [correspond-
ing] increase in the number of arbitragers.' 6 Telescoping would not elim-
inate this unwinding effect.
155. Letter from Shirley E. Hollis, Acting Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission,
to John D. Dingell, Chairman Comm. on Energy and Commerce, at 8-22 (June 13, 1986).
156. Market-On-Close is a market order to be executed on the closing price of the day.
LrrTLE & RHODES, supra note 1.
157. Stoll, supra note 121, at 13.




162. Id. at 15.
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B. Delivery
To avoid expiration day effects, commentators also proposed some type
of delivery other than cash settlement. 63 Stoll raises two concerns about
delivery proposals. First, if shares are delivered as a result of expiration,
transactions in the stock market are not eliminated "since the recipient of
shares may wish to sell them."' 164 Furthermore, arbitragers may attempt to
sell their futures before expiration day. Selling in advance may cause a
decrease in futures prices which may require the arbitrager to unwind his
position by selling shares in the stock market. The arbitragers' sale of shares
into the stock market is not avoided, but simply spread out over time.
165
The second, and probably most important concern is how to actually
make delivery. Stoll suggests four possibilities: "1. Delivery of all stocks in
the index. 2. Delivery of 'acceptable' market baskets. 3. Delivery of certif-
icates which are claims on the index stocks. 4. Delivery of mutual fund
shares."' 66 Presently, the CFTC/SEC Accord permits none of these possi-
bilities. 67 One intuitively can see other regulatory and practical problems
that would occur.
C. Averaging of Index Prices
65
This proposal does not seek "to achieve a more accurate measure of
the current index value, but to reduce the amount of stock market trading
at the close by keying futures and options settlement prices to an average
of index prices during the day." 6 9 Stoll is of the opinion that this averaging
approach "results in a settlement price not reflective of stock market
conditions at the settlement point, the market close."' 170 Averaging of the
index prices disassociates stock index futures prices from its current cash
index price.17 1 Stoll suggests that this "can lead to anomalous results."'
7 2
D. Shift Expiration Days
Stock index futures expire on the third Friday of every third month,
i.e., March, June, September, and December. 73 Index options, on the other





167. Under the Shad/Johnson Accord, the CFTC could not approve futures contracts
calling for delivery of SEC regulated securities. Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-444, § 1, 96 Stat. 2294 (1982).
168. Averaging of index prices would require the use of a "variety of sources in order
to achieve a more accurate indication of the value of the underlying item." Stoll, supra note
121, at 15.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 15-16.
171. Id. at 16.
172. Id. For example, an investor in index futures or options may show a gain based on
closing prices, but there would actually be a loss due to settlement prices.
173. See GOLDMAN SACHS, supra note 23, at 4.
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hand, expire on the third Friday of each month. To accommodate institu-
tional investors, the CFTC adopted common expiration dates for futures
and options. 74 Most evidence shows "that expiration day volume and price
effects are associated primarily with the expiration of futures, not options;
and with the S&P 500 futures in particular, which account for a major
share of index futures trading."' 175 Of all the stock index futures today, the
S&P 500 is the most widely arbitraged. Therefore, whatever day is chosen
for the S&P 500, expiration day effects generally will occur on that date. 76
Accordingly, Stoll asserts that if the CFTC were to shift expiration dates,
there would be no noticeable "effect on the expiration day phenomenon.'
E. Stock Market Procedures and Disclosures
Last hour volume and price effects on expiration day in the stocks
comprising the S&P 500 and other indices are the result of unexpected order
imbalances. To correct this imbalance, the New York Stock Exchange
instituted a new rule requiring members to enter market-on-close orders as
early in the day as possible.' 7' Theoretically, this should not be a problem
if the arbitrager is in a fully hedged position. 179 In practice, however, an
arbitrager engaged in nonhedged positions may not wish to disclose his
orders.1 0 If disclosures are made early, the price effect may not be as great
as "if disclosure is delayed until the close.""'
In his 1987 study, Stoll goes into further detail on this proposal because
it is also one of the SEC recommendations."12 The SEC would require
arbitragers to place MOC orders in a manner that will insure that the orders
are received one-half hour before the close of trading. An arbitrager would
then be guaranteed a trade at the close. For orders placed after the close,
the Exchange would not guarantee a closing price." 3 Stoll concurs that this
recommendation would have the effect of providing for early disclosure of
trading imbalances, 184 which would allow specialist and brokerage companies
to assemble necessary buyers or sellers by the end of the trading day.
However, this procedure may create three major problems. First, under the
current proposal, which the NYSE adopted in September, 1986, arbitragers
have the capacity to cancel their orders. Stoll asserts that this may lead to
174. Stoll, supra note 121, at 17.
175. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 17-18.
178. NYSE RuLE 116.40; see supra note 16.
179. Stoll, supra note 121, at 18; see supra note 16 (discussing arbitragers' practice of
hedging).
180. Stoll, supra note 121, at 18.
181. Id.
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"game playing."' 85 As of late 1987, however, Stoll has not found evidence
of such "game playing.'
1 86
A second problem with the SEC proposal may be the relationship
between most arbitragers and the specialist handling any MOC orders. Stoll
feels this relationship is such that specialists will "accommodate market
orders at the close even if such brokerage firms fail to place MOC orders
at the required time."
1 8 7
A third problem with the SEC proposal is that the NYSE rule that
went into effect only provided a rudimentary picture of order imbalances.
Because the NYSE regulation provided only for certain disclosures, arbitra-
gers did not need to announce some MOC orders before the close. 88 A
brokerage firm placing a large volume of MOC buy orders eventually could
force the market up.18 9 The SEC subsequently has asked for modifications
in this procedure to require investors to announce all index arbitrage MOC
orders one-half hour before closing. Any MOC orders later than one-half
hour before closing may not be related to index arbitrage unwindings. 9
Stoll concludes that as these types of regulations "become more complicated
the problem of enforcement becomes equally complicated."'' 91
A far more radical approach, and one that Stoll concludes would be a
"regulatory and administrative nightmare," is the public disclosure of
arbitrage positions. 92 The public disclosure approach would require insti-
tutional investors engaged in stock index arbitrage to disclose their positions
if the positions might implicate stock market transactions on the expiration
day. 93 This raises two concerns. First, the public disclosure proposal requires
the firm, as well as their customers, to disclose confidential and proprietary
trading information. Second, the public disclosure proposal would require
regulations to specify which positions in futures and options traders would
have to report. Related to this reporting requirement would be a requirement
on how to make the data available to the investing public in a timely
manner "to help insure an appropriate market response."' 94 As a result,
Stoll concludes that this regulatory and administrative headache would not
be an appropriate response.
F. Trading Halts
At one time the SEC proposed a trading halt to occur shortly before
the close, to allow the market to respond to any trading imbalances. While
185. Id. Arbitragers could signal an order imbalance, cancel the order later and take
positions on the other side of the market at more favorable prices. Id.
186. Id. at 19-20.










Stoll does not see a problem with this proposal "in principle,"''9 it effectively
would change the "New York Stock Exchange from a continuous market
to a call-auction market' '196 during the triple witching hour. Stoll is more
inclined to believe that the trading halts proposal is simply a step toward
the SEC's third suggestion, and what has ultimately been enacted, a shift
to the opening price on expiration Friday. 97
G. Opening Price
In 1987, the CFTC permitted the Chicago Mercantile Exchange to use
the "value of the S&P 500 index [futures] at the opening on expiration day
as the settlement price for S&P 500 index futures contracts."'9 8 Accordingly,
S&P index futures now terminate trading on Thursday, using the opening
price on Friday as the settlement price. 99
The main argument for the opening price proposal is that using the
opening price as the settlement price effectively permits specialists to deal
with the large order imbalances occurring in the last hour on expiration
Fridays. Essentially, the opening price proposal permits the specialist time
"to find the other side.' '20 Previously, the specialist had to find the other
side quickly and generally at "distressed" prices. The opening price allows
the specialist to delay opening a stock or to halt trading, if needed, and
disseminate news regarding the order imbalance. 20' Another benefit to using
the opening is that "there is no weekend risk. ' ' 202 Stoll determined that
price effects on expiration day partly reflected the cost of specialists and
other market participants providing immediacy.2° The delay of the opening
price would eliminate the cost associated with having to carry inventory
through the weekend. In response, specialists and other market participants
should be willing to participate on the other side of the order imbalance
"at a smaller price concession."204
Stoll finds, however, certain negative implications to switching to the
opening price as the settlement price. Stoll's first concern is that changing
to the opening price as settlement price "will not mitigate expiration day
price effects. 205 If the expiration day price effect is a fundameantal cost of
providing immediacy, change from the closing price to the opening price
will not alter that cost and therefore will not alter the price effect. ' '206 What
195. Id. at 21.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 27-28.
199. Id. at 28.
200. Id.




205. Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
206. Id.
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will occur, however, is that price effects will not exceed the cost of providing
the immediacy. A second concern about the opening price proposal, and a
substantial one, is that "individual investors participate more heavily at the
opening than at the close.' '207 If volatility simply is shifted from the close
on Friday to the opening, individual investors bear a greater burden. A
third, and equally important concern is the role of the specialist in setting
the opening price. As Stoll pointed out earlier, the specialist has a great
deal of "discretion and power" in setting the opening price at the opening
of the stock market. 20 8 Stoll's concern is that the specialist may be inclined
to take advantage of order imbalances for his own account. When closing
prices are used for settlement, the weekend risk may deter the specialist




A final concern posed by Stoll that the transfer of the settlement price
for stock index futures to opening prices is that the transfer merely switches
the "expiration day price effects to the Thursday close." 210 If unhedged
market positions cause expiration day price effects, transferring the settle-
ment price simply will switch the price effects to Thursday. Thus, arbitragers
will now unwind positions on Thursday at the close in order "to avoid
overnight uncertainties and uncertainties with respect to the Friday expiration
price. '2 1' Furthermore, if there can be "no guarantee that futures contracts
and stock prices will converge on Thursday," arbitragers will unwind early.
212
If no convergence is possible the stock index arbitrager has no reason to
maintain his position until Friday.
III. SEC, CFTC AND SRO'S
Congress established a statutory framework for the regulation of futures
markets in 1936 by enacting the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA).2 3 Con-
gress intended the CEA to regulate trading practices in the agricultural
commodities markets. In 1974, the Commodities Futures Trading Commis-
sion Act (CFTC Act) dramatically changed the CEA.21 4 The CFTC Act
established the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), an in-
dependent regulatory agency to oversee enforcement of the CEA provisions.
The CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction over "accounts, agreements ...
and transactions involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future
delivery, traded or executed on a contract market ... or any other board
of trade, exchange or market. '21 5 The CFTC Act broadly defines the term
207. Id.
208. Id. at 30-31.
209. Id. at 31.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 32.
213. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1976).
214. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 1, 88 Stat.
1389 (1974).
215. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
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"commodity" to include "goods .... services, rights, and interests in which
contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in." 216 The
definition of a commodity is so broad that almost any tangible or intangible
item that is the subject of a futures contract will fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the CFTC, unless specifically excluded.
The CFTC consists of five Commissioners who are appointed by the
President, subject to Senate confirmation. 217 The Commissioners have nu-
merous duties under the CEA. The CFTC regulates the futures markets,
and is authorized to designate contract markets for various types of futures
contracts. 28 This power allows the CFTC effectively to determine the type
of futures contracts that may be traded, and the specific board of trade
(exchange) upon which trading will take place.
The CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction over all futures contracts came into
question with the development of financial futures. In 1975, with minimal
input from other regulatory bodies, the CFTC approved the initial interest-
rate futures contract. However, the rapid growth of interest-rate futures
soon aroused the attention of the Federal Reserve, the U.S. Treasury, and
the SEC. In 1979, the U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve completed a
special joint study that recognized the benefits of interest rate futures and
set the stage for the introduction of other financial futures contracts. 21 9
The success of interest rate futures prompted the introduction of stock
index futures. However, before approving stock index futures contracts, the
CFTC wanted to resolve a highly emotional jurisdictional dispute concerning
these instruments that had arisen between the CFTC and SEC. CFTC
chairman Phillip Johnson and SEC Chairman John Shad negotiated an
agreement, known as the "Shad/Johnson Accord," that effectively resolved
the dispute over index futures between the two regulatory agencies. The
agreement provided:
The SEC would have jurisdiction over options on all securities.
The CFTC would have jurisdiction over all futures contracts based
on broadly based and widely accepted stock indexes which were
settled in cash.
Neither agency would have jurisdiction over futures contracts based
on narrow stock indexes, or on stock groups which were settled by
the actual delivery of stock.
The CFTC would have jurisdiction over options on all futures
contracts, and options on physical commodities which were not
securities.220
216. Id.
217. 7 U.S.C. § 4(a)(1) (1976).
218. 7 U.S.C. § 7 (1976).
219. See, e.g., U.S. TREAsURY DEPT. FED. RESERVE Sys., TREASURY/FEDERAL RESERVE
STtuy oF TREASURY FUTuRES MALKETS.
220. See TRADING MANUAL, supra note 10.
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Congress codified a substantial portion of the Shad/Johnson Accord in the
Futures Trading Act of 1982 (FTA).271 The FTA resolved the jurisdictional
dispute between the SEC and CFTC, and provides the SEC an opportunity
to comment on the approval of any futures stock index contracts. Section
2(A) of the CEA was enacted by the FTA, and provides that:
(i) [t]he Commission [SEC] shall have no jurisdiction to designate
a board of trade as a contract market for any transaction whereby
any party to such transaction acquires any put, call, or other option
on one or more securities, . . . including any group or index of
such securities, or any interest therein or based on the value thereof.
(ii) [t]he Commission [SEC] shall have exclusive jurisdiction with
respect to accounts, agreements ... and transactions involving, and
may designate a board of trade as a contract market in, contracts
of sale (or options on such contracts) for future delivery of a group
or index of securities (or any interest therein or based upon the
value thereof).
222
The FTA specifies three minimum requirements for CFTC approval of
any new index futures contracts. 223 First, the CFTC expressly must find that
the contract provides for settlement in cash or by means other than the
receipt or transfer of a security. Second, the contract cannot readily be
susceptible to manipulation, nor cause the manipulation of the underlying
security or index of securities. Third, the group or index of securities upon
which the contract is based must reflect a substantial segment of the market
for all publicly traded equity or debt securities. The FTA further obligates
the CFTC to "provide an opportunity for public comment on whether such
contracts meet the minimum requirements.... 224
221. Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, § 1, 96 Stat. 2294 (1982).
222. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1976).
223. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a), as amended by the Futures Trading Act of 1982, provides in relevant
part:
(ii) [N]o board of trade shall be designated as a contract market ... unless ... the
Commission expressly finds that the specific contract ... meets the following
minimum requirements:
(I) Settlement of or delivery on such contract (or option on such contract) shall be
effected in cash or by means other than the transfer or receipt of any security,
except an exempted security ....
(II) Trading in such contract ... shall not be readily susceptible to manipulation of
the price of such contract .... nor to causing or being used in the manipulation of
the price of any underlying security, option on such security or option on a group
or index including such securities; and
(III) Such group or index of securities shall be predominantly composed of the
securities of unaffiliated issuers and shall be a widely published measure of, and
shall reflect, the market for all publicly traded equity or debt securities or a substantial




The FTA also requires the CFTC to consult with the SEC on any
application for new index futures contracts.225 If the SEC objects to the
contract, the CFTC must afford the SEC an opportunity for an oral hearing.
If the oral hearing does not resolve the SEC's objection to approval, the
CFTC may enter an order approving the contract?226 However, the FTA
entitles the SEC to judicial review of the CFTC order.
227
Another important issue that arose with respect to stock index futures
concerned margins. The CFTC has never had authority to set margin
requirements for futures contracts. Instead, the futures exchange upon which
the contract trades has sole discretion in setting margin requirements.? 8
Some members of Congress felt that the Federal Reserve System or the
CFTC should be allowed to set margins on index futures contracts. The
issue was resolved temporarily when CFTC Chairman, Philip Johnson,
agreed with Federal Reserve Chairman, Paul Volker, "that while the Fed
could officially exert jurisdiction over setting margins on equity index futures
contracts, . . . the Fed would not exert such jurisdiction if the exchanges
being approved for such contracts would agree to set their initial speculative
margins at levels equal to at least 10% of the value of the contracts."' 29
All futures exchanges complied with the agreement, and presently continue
to set margin requirements on all futures contracts. Although the informal
agreement temporarily settled the margin issue, the Black Monday crash
has resurrected the debate. 0
The stock market crash also raised the issue of whether the CFTC was
capable of regulating the financial futures markets in light of the futures
markets' substantial growth in recent years. 23' Because of the CFTC's
perceived inability to regulate effectively the powerful futures exchanges,
which detest regulation, the CFTC has been referred to as a "tail-wagging
watch dog."2' 2 Although such allegations appear harsh, evidence shows that




228. See TRADING MANUAL, supra note 10, at 20-21.
229. Id. at 10-22; see also supra note 29.
230. See, e.g., Melloan, The Market Meltdown Made Phelan A Prophet, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 27, 1987, at 34, col. 3; Chicago's Merc Offers No Meltdown Mea Culpas, Wall St. J.,
Nov. 3, 1987, at 35, col. 3; McMurray, Chaotic Week Illustrates Widening Rift Between Stock
and Stock-Index Exchanges, Wall St. J., Oct. 26, 1987, at 18, col. 1; Panel Probes Role of
Futures, Index Arbitrage in Market Crash, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at 1686
(Nov. 6, 1987).
231. Representative Edward Markey commented, "I think the world as the CFTC knew
it permanently changed as of 4 p.m. Monday afternoon." See Ingersoll, Market Collapse
Could Redefine the Roll of U.S. Futures Agency, Wall St. J., Oct. 26, 1987, at 17, col. 1.
232. See, e.g., Jehl, Regulatory Panel Scored for Inaction as Market Plunged, L. A.
Times, Oct. 28, 1987, § 4, at 1, col. 2.
233. The CFTC's lenient posture in regulating the futures exchanges is reflected by the
fact that the CFTC had never invoked its power to deny an application for an index futures
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If the CFTC survives the crash intact, its survival undoubtedly will depend
upon the CFTC's adoption of a more stringent regulatory approach.
Since the introduction of these derivative investments, the SEC, the
CFTC, and the SROs have conducted studies to determine the investments'
overall effects on the stock market and the capital formation process .2
4
Prior to Black Monday, the SEC and the CFTC consistently held that
significant increases or decreases in the market resulted from changing
investor attitudes regarding fundamental economic conditions.25 The market
volatility that resulted from index trading strategies did not cause or
precipitate the market's increases or decreases. The SEC's Division of
Market Regulation determined that "index-related futures trading was in-
strumental in the rapid transmission of these changed investor perceptions
to individual stock prices and may have condensed the time period in which
the decline occurred." 6 The Division's review of the market decline deter-
mined that stock index arbitrage created more efficient markets. 217 An
efficient market, linked by index futures, permitted large portfolio managers
to make large, rapid shifts in their equities. The study suggests that if the
decline had resulted from technical factors and not fundamentals, "the
market should have quickly reversed a significant portion of its decline." 8
The Division study showed that price reversals occur on Mondays following
an expiration Friday, when the market reverses itself in the direction opposite
to that observed at Friday's close.219 On September 11-12 the DJIA main-
tained its current level. "The absence of a reversal suggests that technical
factors related to index trading were not the primary source of the September
11-12 decline." Indeed, the Division concludes that the significance of
index futures may have been to transcend price changes that would have
occurred, "into a shorter time period." 24
On January 23, 1987, the stock market once again experienced extreme
volatility with record volume at that time of 302,390,000 shares. The DJIA
increased 64 points during the morning before falling approximately 115
points in little more than one hour. The DJIA reversed itself twice more
during the afternoon, only to close 44.15 points down. 2 In response to
contract, prior to the stock market crash. Id.. However, after the crash the CFTC refused
indefinitely to approve eleven new stock index futures contracts. In reaction presidents of two
of the largest futures exchanges stated, "[t]he move was too sweeping," and "[ilt's a shame
to have to send out a blanket action." Ingersoll, CFTC Blocks 11 New Index Products, Cites
Need for More Trading Safeguards, Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1987, at 55, col. 2.
234. See supra note 9 (noting recent studies of derivative investments' effect on market
and on capital formation process).
235. Id.






242. Criidele, The Dow Average Swings 114 Points; Closes Down by 44, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 24, 1987, at 1, col. 5.
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continued concern over price volatility, especially on nonexpiration Fridays,
the SEC, the CFTC, and the NYSE initiated reviews regarding securities
and index futures trading on that day. As a result of these reviews, certain
measures were taken to curb expiration day volatility.2 3 The NYSE required
all market-on-close orders to be submitted by 3:30 p.m. on expiration
Friday.24 Additionally, NYSE specialists were to disseminate order imbal-
ances of 50,000 shares or more in 50 pilot stocks. 24 The CME modified
the settlement date for its S&P 500 index futures contract, which the majority
of stock index arbitragers utilize. 2" Finally, settlement for the S&P 500
contract was changed to the opening value of the S&P 500 index, instead
of the closing value on expiration Friday.2 7 The change in expiration time
is significant because it allows the NYSE to use its Opening Automated
Report Service (OARS) to process the surge of orders associated with the
closing of stock index arbitrage positions upon expiration of the S&P 500
contract. The OARS system matches buy and sell orders entered into DOT
prior to the commencement of trading, and disseminates any order imbal-
ances to each specialist, who uses the figure to determine an opening price
for the particular stock.2 " By changing the settlement of the S&P 500
contract to the opening index value, the OARS system can now process the
enormous stock orders that are entered just prior to expiration.2 9 June 19,
1987, was the first expiration date on which all corrective measures were in
place. The quarterly expiration of index futures and stock index arbitrage
caused nominal stock market volatility that day.Y0
The SROs attempted to deal responsibly with the unwarranted stock
market volatility on triple witching days. However, a repercussion of Black
Monday may be the erection of substantial barriers to the efficient use of
stock index arbitrage.Y' Broad constraints placed on stock index arbitrage
243. See Rose, Big Board and Chicago Merc Set Plan to Reduce Triple-Witching Volatility,
Wall St. J., June 8, 1987, at 31, col. 1.
244. See NYSE, CME & NYFE, Special Notice Expiration Procedure for June 19, 1987
(June 5, 1987).
245. Rose, supra note 243, at 31, col. 1.
246. Donnelly, Playing the Stock-Index Arbitrage Game, INsrTIONAL INVESTOR, Feb.
1, 1985, at 153.
247. See Special Notice, supra note 244.
248. See, e.g., Letter from Shirley E. Hollis, Acting Secretary of the SEC, to Congressman
Dingell, Chairman, Comm. on Energy and Commerce (June 13, 1986); see also Wunsch, Stock
Index Futures (Kidder Peabody & Co. Research, May 5, 1987).
249. Id.
250. See Program Trading: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and
Finance of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (July 23, 1987)
(testimony of Charles J. Henry, Chicago Board Options Exchange); see also SEC Says Program
Trading Changes Greatly Reduced Volatility Woes, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at
1083 (July 24, 1987); Garcia, Triple-Witching Day Doesn't Roil Stocks as New Trading
Procedures Curb Volume, Wall St. J., June 22, 1987, at 32, col. 1.
251. See Angrist, Assessing Blame, FoRBEs, Nov. 30, 198, at 254; Norris, Villain or
Scapegoat? The Heat's On Program Trading, BARRoNs, Oct. 26, 1987, at 6; Wunczinger,
Confusion Follows SEC Reaction to Stock Crash, Nat'l L. J., Nov. 9, 1987, at 20, col. 1;
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as a direct result of the crash seriously may impair the efficiency and use
of the index futures market. Major constraints on stock index arbitrage
also would be ironic because the volume of stock index arbitrage on October
19, 1987, was half of its normal volume. 2 2 The Securities and Exchange
Commission submitted a report of the Black Monday market decline in
early February 1988.253 The SEC determined that the markets have become
more volatile and risky, and more individual investors may be frightened
away from the market unless changes are made. This conclusion that the
markets have become more volatile encompasses the time since the market
crash, and not the period prior to the crash. In their 900-page report,
however, the SEC was unable to determine precisely what caused the DJIA
to plunge 500 points in one day.
25 4
The SEC stated that one basic factor in the plunge was investors'
realization that stocks were overvalued. Thus, futures trading and strategies
involving futures were not the "sole cause" of the market break. However,
the existence of stock index futures and the various trading strategies
involving program trading was a significant factor in the market break. 51
The report concluded that computer driven trading programs contributed
substantially to the suddenness of the plunge.
The report suggested that regulators and the exchanges increase the size
of the down payments (margin) that investors must have on hand when
buying stock. The report further recommended that regulators and exchanges
increase the capital requirements for the specialists. The report concluded
that while the specialists, as a whole, performed competently, there was a
significant inability of some specialists to perform their duties. 2 6 Conse-
quently, the SEC believes that whatever relationship program trading and
the institutionalization of the markets had to the market decline, the NYSE
must assume greater responsibility in monitoring the performance of indi-
vidual specialists. 257 This could be made possible by increasing the market's
capacity to handle an onslaught of orders and the establishment of new
specialists' posts at the exchanges to cope with institutions' computer
program trading strategies.
The SEC report, while aiming to decrease volatility, did not prescribe
any concrete recommendations to counter institutions' increasing dominance
of the market through the use of computer driven programs and derivative
Rosenblatt, Program Trades Will Likely Be Suspended, Say Industry Experts, L. A. Times,
Oct. 24, 1987, § 4, at 1, col. 5; McMurray, Washout Poses Threat to Future of Stock-Index
Markets, Wall St. J., Oct. 22, 1987, at 6, col. 1.
252. Ingersoll, CFTC Reports On Index Arbitrage In Market Crash, Wall St. J., Nov.
i1, 1987, at 39, col. 1.
253. The October 1987 Market Break, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1271 (Feb. 9, 1988)
(Extra Edition).
254. Id. at xii.
255. Id. at 3-11.
256. Id. at 4-27.
257. Id. at 4-28.
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investments. The SEC warned that failure to address the full range of
factors that precipitated the market plunge may prompt small investors to
stay away from the market. The SEC feels that this may have serious
economic consequences in the long run.
The enormous public outcry since the market plunge has prompted the
SEC to give temporary approval to a NYSE rule that curbs the use of
program trading whenever the Dow Jones Industrial Average moves fifty
points or more in one direction, in one day.28 The rule bars securities
dealers for the rest of the day from conducting index arbitrage program
trading through the exchange's automated order system (DOT). The rule's
goal is to tone down the volatility in the market and return investor
confidence.2 9 The dealers still will be permitted to use their 'own traders to
perform the functions previously accomplished through the DOT system.
2
60
In respopse to these curtailments and mounting pressure from clients,
regulators, and Washington, five major securities firms temporarily halted
the use of program trading for their own accounts. 26' All of the firms said
that they would continue to use stock index arbitrage for customer accounts.
An official at one of the firms stated that his firm had withdrawn because
there had been too great a "loss of confidence in the markets."1
2
6
There are, however, those who feel the withdrawal and the NYSE 50
point curbs are unfortunate and that the long term effect may be to make
the U.S. securities markets less competitive with other markets. 263 The
financial community, Washington, and the SEC are still struggling with the
effects of October 19, 1987. The debate regarding stock index arbitrage has
only increased. Washington continues to demand reforms to bolster smaller
investors' confidence in the market. The SEC commissioners are not sure
whether any of the reforms instituted will be beneficial in the long run.
Additionally, the financial community seems divided about the effect of
program trading or stock index arbitrage on the market.
IV. CONGRESS AND PROGRAM TRADING
Congress, in contrast to academic commentators, the SEC, and the
financial community, has not been as expansive in its praise for the new
derivative investments. Beginning in 1984, Congress expressed some concern
regarding program trading and what was occurring on expiration Friday,
the "triple witching hour." In fact, since that time Congress has pressured
for a monitoring of the effects of stock index futures and options on the
258. Ricks, Outcry Grows Against Program Trading; SEC Provisionally Backs Big Board
Curb, Wall St. J., April 21, 1988, at 4, col. 2.
259. Smith, Big Board Mulls New Trade Bans If Market Swings, Wall St. J., April 13,
1988, at 3, col. 1.
260. See supra note 43 (explaining how DOT *system operates).
261. Swartz & Salwen, Five Companies Decide to Halt Index Trades, Wall St. J., May
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stock market and, most importaitly to Congress, the effects on the indi-
vidual investor.
In April, 1986, the House of Representatives' Committee on Energy
and Commerce through its chairman, John D. Dingell of Michigan, began
to ask the SEC specific questions regarding program trading.2 4 After
reviewing the 1986 Stoll and Whaley study, the Committee sought specific
answers from then Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman John
S.R. Shad. 265 The Committee was concerned with why the Stoll and Whaley
Study merely focused on the effects of program trading on expiration Friday
and not on program trading's "impact ... outside of that narrow con-
text. ' ' 26 The Committee wanted the SEC to answer questions regarding a
perceived shift in the market away from trading stocks "on fundamentals
such as a company's earnings and dividends" to trading "on technical,
computer strategies that swing the market drastically. . .. ',267 More specif-
ically, the Committee wanted the SEC to address "whether the marketplace
will lose credibility with the public because of 'artificial' or 'distorted' prices
and volume; whether program trading concentrates too much power in the
hands of big investment firms; and whether it undermines the traditional
function of stock analysts and the capital-raising function of the stock
market."
268
The Committee based these concerns on the understanding that program
trading could hurt anyone caught on the wrong side of the trading. 269 The
Committee's concerns were heightened by three dramatic swings in the
DJIA. Two of the three swings did not involve an expiration Friday. The
Stoll and Whaley Study suggested to the Committee "that the market might
have a less volatile triple witching hour and that the effect on stock prices
appears to be diminishing as more traders become aware of how the
programs work." 270 In the Committee's opinion "it was wrong." 27'
Legislation twice has been proposed to alleviate uncertainties created by
these financial instruments that seem so foreign to individuals. H.R. 1487
was Iowa Representative Neal Smith's attempt to amend the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.272 The bill prohibited an individual who trades for
his own account to "own, control, have a beneficial interest in, or enter
into any contract or contract for future delivery in any financial instrument,
stock index, securities index, and any contract for future delivery.... 273
The bill's primary focus was on brokerage firms trading for their own
264. See Johnson Testimony, supra note 35, at 16.
265. Id.










accounts. The bill attempted to reconcile the inherent conflicts raised by
firms that trade in these products not only for themselves but on behalf of
institutional clients and individual investors. The question raised was: Whose
orders get handled first, the firm's, the clients', or the individual's? To
Congress, this was an important question as it attempted to maintain fair
and orderly markets for the institutional investor and, more importantly,
for the individual investor.
A second effort to regulate the financial markets was H.R. 2668, which
would have been known as the "Securities Trading Reform Act of 1987."274
The bill was another attempt to amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
The bill would have provided the SEC and the CFTC the power to institute
trading halts on all markets. 275 Congress specifically found that it may be
necessary at times to halt trading "for an appropriate period of time ...
for the purpose of facilitating the orderly dissemination of material infor-
mation concerning the issuer, the security, or the market for the security.
'276
Congress also found that there may be days when "excessive volatility may
occur" when stock index futures and options expire. 277 Congress also found
that trading halts should extend to these markets to enable '-'the public
interest to moderate the effects of certain program trading. ,278 The amend-
ment would have permitted the SEC and the CFTC to suspend trading "for
not more than one business day." 279 The SEC could have renewed or
extended the trading halt.? °
Congress intended this amendment to return some stability to a market
that they felt was becoming extremely volatile. This perception of increased
volatility on expiration Friday, and also on nonexpiration days, may impair
investors' confidence in the fairness and integrity of the securities market.
It would appear that this provision within the amendment is Congress'
attempt to strengthen the SEC's power to stabilize the financial markets in
times of crisis. If the SEC's power to stabilize the markets were increased,
investors again could rely on the market process to the fullest.
To ascertain the role of program trading in the stock market, the House
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance held hearings during the
summer of 1987. Representatives of regulatory bodies, market participants,
and experts in the field of derivative investments testified and expressed
their views on "program trading." Their opinions are discussed in more
detail in sections III and IV, dealing with the brokerage industry and the
regulatory community, respectively.
Representative Edward J. Markey (Mass.), Chairman of the Committee
on Energy and Commerce, declared in his opening statement to the panel
274. H.R. 2668, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 1 (1987).
275. Id. § 110.
276. Id. § I 10(a)(1).
277. Id. § I 10(a)(3).
278. Id.
279. Id. § 110(b)(2)(B)(i).
280. Id. § 110(b)(2)(B)(iii).
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that the meeting was being held tC discuss "one of the most important new
phenomena affecting our financial markets today: 'program trading.' ",281
Representative Markey explained that the Subcommittee on Telecommuni-
cations and -Finance became aware of program trading in April, 1984,
mainly because of investor complaints regarding "triple witching" expira-
tions. On the date of these hearings volatility of the markets on non-
expiration days caused increased alarm. The September 11-12, 1986, drop
in the DJIA and the January 23, 1987 swing in same day trading were both
attributed to program trading. What the Subcommittee attempted to deter-
mine was whether " 'program trading' [was] a source of increased short-
term price volatility in the securities markets? ' 28 2 Again, Congress expressed
its concern for the individual investors' exposure as a nonparticipant in
program trading. The Subcommittee asked these market professionals for
"measures" to protect the integrity of the markets and prevent loss of
investor confidence. Ironically, Representative Markey wondered in his
opening statement whether the true test for the use of advanced technology
in intermarket trading will come not in a rising market but "in a situation
we have not yet witnessed: the impact of program trading during a failing
market. '283 Representative Markey's prophecy came true less than three
months later.
The market professionals' testimony to the Subcommittee reflected their
common belief that the inherent benefits of the new derivative products
have enhanced the system. 284 Congress now is reconciling this view with the
current knowledge of October 19, 1987, and its effects on the market.
Congress must address these differing views to regulate the financial markets
further.
Accordingly, Congress is beginning to wade through the wealth of
information, opinions, and concerns that are being made available and
expressed on a daily basis. Senator Donald Riegle, Jr., of Michigan,
chairman of the Subcommittee on Securities of the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, issued a statement on October 22, 1987,
expressing his views regarding the recent turbulence in the financial mar-
kets. 23 Senator Riegle asked that the committee move to establish an
International Securities Regulatory Commission to regulate and coordinate
international securities markets to help avoid future panics. 286 He also asked
that the SEC reconstruct the events of the October 19, 1987 fall in the
DJIA to determine the nature and volume of selling by institutions, mutual
281. See Program Trading: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and
Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 23,
1987) (opening statement of Representative Edward J. Markey).
282. Id.
283. Id. at 2.
284. See supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text (discussing benefits from new derivative
trading strategies).




funds, portfolio insurance strategies, futures selling, and program selling.28 7
Furthermore, Senator Riegle asked that the Administration establish a new
Special Advisory Committee to study the securities markets. 28 Senator Riegle
expressed these same concerns in a letter to David Ruder, Chairman of the
SEC. Senator Riegle expressed a further concern about the treatment of the
individual investor. He wondered, for example, whether brokers gave indi-
viduals the same consideration in placing orders that the brokers gave large
traders. 8 19
The Administration appointed a panel, headed by Wall Street executive
and former New Jersey Senator Nicholas Brady, to study the market.
2 0
Representative Markey, Chairman of the House of Representatives Subcom-
mittee on Telecommunications and Finance of the Committee on Energy
and Commerce, asked for a bipartisan investigation into the causes of the
decline of October 19, 1987.291 Markey requested that the investigation focus
on both "macroeconomic causes such as the budget and trade deficits which
dictated the direction of the market and technical factors such as program
trading .... -292
Several House and Senate committees also are investigating actively the
recent market decline and its overall effect on the market and market
participants. Congress wishes to maintain the integrity of the marketplace
that the securities laws were designed to protect. Efforts currently are being
made to determine the "cause" of the market decline and what regulation
is needed to best serve market participants. 293
The Report of the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms
(Brady Report) was given to the President on January 8, 1988.294 The Brady
Report blamed the automatic trading programs for generating massive sell
orders that resulted in the market decline of October 19, 1987. The report
expressed concern that reactive selling by institutions, that followed portfolio
insurance strategies and that sought to liquidate large fractions of stock
holdings regardless of price, played a major role in the market crash. The
Brady Commission expressed concern about the large concentration of
trading potential that resulted from portfolio insurance. The Brady Com-
mission also determined that stock index arbitrage did not account for the
kind of volume some experts had believed, but such trading occurred at
particularly sensitive times during the market's downward spiral, signifi-
cantly worsening the drop.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Letter from Donald W. Riegle, Jr. to David S. Ruder, Chairman, Securities and
Exchange Commission (Oct. 22, 1987).
290. See infra notes 291-92 and accompanying text (discussing Brady Commission's
findings).
291. Markey Announces Bi Partisan Probe into Causes Collapse of Stock Market, 19 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 1604 (Oct. 30, 1987).
292. Id.
293. See supra note 9 (noting several studies of market crash).
294. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1267 (Jan. 12, 1988) (Extra Edition).
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Ironically, however, the Brady Report did not recommend any curbs
on computerized program trading. Instead, the Brady Commission recom-
mended a four-part solution. First, the Brady Commission recommended
the creation of a super-regulatory agency to oversee the markets. The Brady
Commission argued that the stock, opti6ns, and futures markets can no
longer be considered separate markets. Rather, because price swings in one
immediately will affect prices in another, the markets essentially comprise
one unified market. The Commission nominated the Federal Reserve Board
as the most appropriate central authority.
Second, the Brady Report asked that there be one standard for margins
to control speculation. To control speculation, there should be consistent
margin requirements for purchasing all financial instruments. Raising margin
requirements, though, may dampen speculation. On October 19, 1987, the
futures market needed more speculators, not fewer. Speculators would have
bought contracts that portfolio insurers were attempting to sell. Raising the
cost of speculation could spell the end of portfolio insurance using index
futures.
Third, the Brady Commission suggested "circuit breakers" that would
halt trading in certain stocks and futures instruments if selling pressure
becomes too intense. However, dangers exist in creating new circuit breakers.
At the present time, the market contains mechanisms to halt tradings. One
such mechanism is an order imbalance. Another mechanism is the NYSE's
decision to close the small order execution system to program traders. 295
That decision, however, closed the market to index arbitragers whose
activities may have narrowed the huge gap between futures and stock prices
and halted the decline.
Lastly, the report asked for a single clearing and settlement system for
all stocks, bonds, and futures. This system would insure the financial
integrity of the markets. In line with this recommendation, the Brady Report
asked that the exchanges install better information systems to monitor the
markets.
The report made many observations but often did not offer suggestions
on how to solve the problems. The Brady Commission, though, did conclude
that both stock index arbitrage and portfolio insurance pushed the market
down.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The financial markets have undergone a dramatic change due to program
trading. When one is deciding whether regulation is necessary, one first
must weigh the benefits flowing from-the use of program trading strategies
against the potential harm.
The benefits or advantages which seem to be most commonly mentioned
in this Article are those that typically are enjoyed by financial institutions
295. See supra note 43.
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engaging in these strategies. The advantages are increased execution effi-
ciency, liquidity, risk management, a decrease in transaction and market
impact costs, enhanced asset allocation and deployment, and the rapid
buying and selling of baskets of stocks. Institutions, more so than the small
investor, have enjoyed these benefits because of the advanced telecommun-
ications and computer technology of which only large institutions with their
vast financial holdings can take advantage. The small investor is not entirely
precluded from these benefits. Participation in mutual funds and pension
plans enables small investors to reap many of the same benefits as large
institutions, although indirectly.
The potential harm of program trading strategies is the apparent or
actual volatility that takes place in the market. The studies conclude that
there is volatility on expiration days and some nonexpiration days. However,
overall volatility on the stock market and the S&P 500 Index, in percentage
terms, is no more volatile than ten years ago. Volatility may affect the
small, individual investor more than the financial institutions because indi-
vidual investors do not understand the underlying complexities. Therefore,
the investor cannot circumnavigate periods of volatility in the market as
well as institutions that have a more sophisticated understanding of the
strategies and the technology to implement the strategies.
A second potential harm relating to volatility is the order imbalances
that occur with a sudden influx of buy or sell orders, "causing" much of
the perceived or actual volatility. Because institutions are concerned only
with the stock price and the index converging on expiration date, this is
not a major harm to institutions. The harm may be to the small investor
who is placing orders during a temporary rise or fall in the market. By
placing these orders, small investors may be paying more or receiving less
than they anticipated.
The major harm, therefore, seems to be in the area of volatility. The
concern, however, may be focused inappropriately on "program trading
instead of on those responsible for the free flow of trading and market
makers. ' 296 The real problem may be with specialists who are charged with
the responsibility of insuring an orderly and efficient market. Several reports,
including the Brady Commission report, have characterized the specialist
system as being "primitive, often chaotic and very susceptible to human
error." Basically, the Brady Commission found that the system did not
work on October 19. Likewise, the market making system of the NASD,
the NYSE specialist system counterpart, also did not work.
Specifically, the Brady Commission found that only about forty percent
of the specialists effectively tried to keep the market orderly on October
19. The other sixty percent of the specialists worsened the crash by joining
the stampede. Many market makers in the OTC followed suit and refused
to answer their phones.
296. For a different position see Hazen, Volatility and Market Inefficiency: A Commentary
on the Effects of Options, Futures, and Risk Arbitrage on the Stock Market, 44 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 789 (1987).
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The record volume of trading on October 19 exposed two major
problems with the specialists and market making systems: undercapitalization
and out-dated trading technology. The undercapitalization problem is al-
ready being addressed. One reform which was suggested last year is being
executed rapidly. After a long history of prohibition, large brokerage firms
may now own specialist firms. Chairman Ruder suggests a possible future
reform. He mentioned the possibility of assessing the exchange's member
firms a certain amount, which would be put into a pool from which
specialists could draw in certain unusual circumstances.
The low-tech problem of the specialist system is apparent if one considers
the specialists' official means of communication. The official means are
"slips of paper with stock symbols and prices scrawled on them." Addi-
tionally, prequotation data is hand fed into a reader through the use of
antiquated IBM punch cards, marked with a No. 2 pencil.
Exchanges must implement high technology systems. Possible proposals
that would ultimately replace the specialist system are electronic trading,
where brokers and investors directly deal with each other, using mutual
video screens. The London Exchange, as well as NASDAQ, are already
moving toward electronic trading.
Clearly there are benefits to "program trading" and the harms associ-
ated with it appear to be related to an inability of those responsible for
trading to handle the excess of volume and increased capital demands that
are often concentrated in a short period of time. The emphasis on long
term regulation of program trading is unwarranted. Instead, interim regu-
lation of program trading strategies may be necessary until the specialist
and market making systems are appropriately capitalized and are updated
to meet the technology available to the institutions.
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